HIGH 7.5 NVD
CVE-2026-130627
The Vert.x HTTP client transport (a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx) hand-rolls a POST redirect follower that, when the documented PostBuilder.followRedirects(true
The Vert.x HTTP client transport (a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx) hand-rolls a POST redirect follower that, when the documented PostBuilder.followRedirects(true) opt-in is enabled, re-issues the redirected request with the full request header map copied verbatim and performs no credential stripping and no same-authority check. A malicious, compromised, or mistyped agent that returns a 30x response with an absolute cross-host Location causes the client to forward the standard Authorization header (Bearer/Basic/OAuth) — plus every other header, including the allowlisted API-key headers — to the attacker-controlled authority. This breaks the project's own cross-transport invariant (SECURITY.md §8, OkHttpPostRedirectHeaderLeakTest) that credentials are stripped on cross-authority redirects even when redirects are followed. The sibling JDK and OkHttp/Android transports strip Authorization; Vert.x uniquely does not. This is a "fix introduced the bug" variant — the follower was added by the GHSA-9rhm hardening PR (3ae82912, refined by a5e76a0b).
References
- https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/security/advisories/GHSA-w377-w7c6-c8hr
- https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/security/advisories/GHSA-w377-w7c6-c8hr
This high severity vulnerability with a CVSS score of 7.5 was published on 2026-11-17 via NVD.
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