HIGH 7.6 NVD
CVE-2026-115863
ConnMan through 2.0 has a stack-based buffer overflow via a DHCPv6 Reply message. This occurs in get_domains in gdhcp/client.c. It copies a fixed NS_MAXDNAME (1
ConnMan through 2.0 has a stack-based buffer overflow via a DHCPv6 Reply message. This occurs in get_domains in gdhcp/client.c. It copies a fixed NS_MAXDNAME (1025) bytes from a DHCPv6 DOMAIN_LIST (option 24) value into a 1026-byte stack buffer dns_name regardless of the actual option length, then walks DNS labels with an unbounded "c += jump + 1" loop. A crafted DHCPv6 REPLY with a DOMAIN_LIST option of >= 1025 non-zero bytes makes the label walk leave the buffer and read/write '.' past its end in attacker-chosen strides. An on-link attacker can trigger this without authentication via a forged Router Advertisement (O=1) and a forged DHCPv6 REPLY matching xid/CLIENTID with a long DOMAIN_LIST. The impact is unauthenticated on-link crash of connmand (runs as root). This was introduced in bb06c47.
References
- https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/connman/connman.git/commit/?id=bb06c47101ca243fa5c0
- https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/connman/connman.git/tree/gdhcp/client.c
- https://lore.kernel.org/connman/179274561161.81299.4579745057858200074@pm.me/
This high severity vulnerability with a CVSS score of 7.6 was published on 2026-10-23 via NVD.
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